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Journal of the T. E. Lawrence Society 
ISSN 0963-1747

Vol. V, No. 1, Autumn 1995

Edited by Philip Kerrigan

The Lawrence - Aaronsohn Relationship

Amram Scheyer

Most writers concerned with T. E. Lawrence devote some lines or a whole paragraph to Chaim Weizmann, major Zionist leader contemporary with Lawrence and later Israel's first President. Little attention is given, however, to Aaron Aaronsohn, brilliant agronomist and co-founder of NILI, the clandestine militant Zionist organisation in Turkish occupied Palestine. NILI collaborated - by choice - with British Intelligence, based in Egypt. 

Aaronsohn's opinions, regarding both Lawrence's personality and his activities among the Bedouin, contradicted those of Weizmann as recorded in his biography Trial and Error, and in his later contribution to T. E. Lawrence by his Friends. The divergent views of two leading Zionists reflect the burgeoning rift between 'right' and 'left' in the Zionist movement. 

Mainstream Zionism, in both pre-statehood Israel and in the early years of the state, stayed aloof from the exploits, politics and sacrifices of NILI: it was consigned to partial oblivion. This was true save for one aspect: Weizmann's view of Lawrence took second place in contemporary writings on Middle Eastern affairs to Aaronsohn's acrimonious opinions. 

In Weizmann's own words he saw Lawrence thus: 

'I would like at this point to pay tribute to the services which T. E. Lawrence rendered our cause, and to add something regarding his remarkable personality. I had met Lawrence fleetingly in Egypt, with Allenby and later in Palestine. I was to meet him quite often later, and he was an occasional visitor to our house in London. His relationship to the Zionist movement was a very positive one, in spite of the fact that he was strongly pro-Arab, and he has mistakenly been represented as anti-Zionist, it was his view - and it was Feisal's - that the Jews would be of great help to the Arabs, and that the Arab world stood to gain much from a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. 

'His personality was complex and difficult. He was profoundly shy: his manner was whimsical, and it was difficult to get him to talk seriously. He was much given to the Oxford type of sardonic humour. But when one did manage to get him into a serious vein he was frank and friendly, and his opinions, especially regarding the affairs of the Near East, were really worth having'.¹ 

Even a person as circumspect and discerning as Weizmann attached to Lawrence the tag 'pro-Arab'. But it should be remembered that 'the Arabs' have never been, save in a linguistic and vaguely ethnic sense, an entity - certainly not a political entity. Nobody was 'pro-Arab' in an all-embracing sense, not even 'the Arabs' themselves; neither was Lawrence, whatever he or his detractors' statements may have said on the subject. 

The same argument applies to Lawrence's attitude to Zionism or Zionist aspirations, something amply documented and recorded. I share the view that his opinion of and attitude to Zionism should be considered within the framework of opinions circulating in the Arab Bureau. Bruce Westrate, author of a recently published work on the Bureau² illustrates this aptly:

 '. . .the Arab Bureau had no initial "collective" view with respect to Britain's evolving policy toward Zionists, inasmuch as they understood it. But clearly, Gilbert Clayton, D. G. Hogarth, Kinahan Cornwallis, T. E. Lawrence, et al, were uncomfortable from the outset with the concept of Zionism and suspicious as to Chaim Weizmann's ultimate motives. Moreover, as I stress repeatedly in The Arab Bureau, their preoccupation lay first and foremost with the strategic future of the British Empire in the post-war Middle East. While appreciative of the geopolitical benefits which might accompany British control of Palestine (i.e. enhanced security for Egypt and the Suez Canal), most Bureau officers agonised over the mischief which the Balfour Declaration might work on Anglo-Sharifian relations. . . . 

'Regardless of Zionist arguments for a "national home", Clayton and his colleagues were not prepared to place either the fortunes of the Arab Revolt or anticipated imperial gains after the war at risk on its behalf. . . .It is abundantly clear from the evidence that British officials disagreed among themselves as to what the Balfour Declaration really meant, just as they had over the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The reasons for this derive, of course, from the differing perspectives and priorities of London and Cairo. And though initially willing to give Balfour's policy a chance, the more Bureau officers learned about Zionist objectives and tactics, the less they liked. "I am personally backing him [Weizmann]," Hogarth hedged, "so long as he is moderate, but I fear things have gone too far in Palestine for us to take cover." Indeed, just as French ambitions in the Levant ultimately thwarted the carefully crafted imperial strategy of T. E. Lawrence and his colleagues, Balfour's ambiguous commitment to the Zionists needlessly exposed them and the Empire they served to unsought and undeserved allegations of duplicity toward Britain's Arab allies'.³ 

These extracts demonstrate that it would be rewarding and revealing to examine the views of D. G. Hogarth, Lt.-Com. R.N.R., (Lawrence's most influential early mentor), and those of his nominal superior in London, Captain Reginald Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence and one of the 'midwives' of the Balfour Declaration.⁴ 

Later Sir Ronald Storrs (described by Lawrence as 'the most brilliant man in the Near East'), the Military Governor of Jerusalem, wrote: 

'. . .when therefore early in March 1918 Clayton showed me the telegram informing us of the impending arrival of a Zionist commission, composed of eminent Jews, to act as liaison between the Jews and the Military Administration, and to control the Jewish population, we could hardly believe our eyes. . . '⁵ 

There are two main sources for the Lawrence-Aaronsohn relationship: firstly, Aaronsohn's diaries, written primarily in French from 1916 to 1919, the year he mysteriously disappeared on a flight between England and France. The second source is his contributions to The Arab Bulletin, in particular to Bulletin No.64 of November 1917. This contains a remarkable memorandum by him under the heading, 'Palestine - The Jewish Colonies'. It was not his first or only contribution to the Bulletin, but it was certainly his most polemical. 

It is no wonder that the Bulletin's editors found it necessary to add a preface: 'It is a departure from precedent to admit controversy to the Bulletin, but the following memorandum by one of the leaders of the Jewish movement, dealing with the criticism that the Jewish penetration of Palestine is to the detriment of the native population, is perhaps of sufficient interest to warrant an exception. No responsibility, is of course, taken for the accuracy of its contents or for the views expressed.' 

The editors also thought it prudent to add an enigmatic note to the end of the memorandum stating that it had been submitted to another 'Zionist leader of equal authority' who took exception to Aaronsohn's view of the need to 'expel' the 'dwellers of land acquired'. It is obvious from this addendum that the issue discussed was of concern to the Bureau - including Lawrence - because its possible repercussions warranted a 'departure from precedent'. 

In considering the memorandum itself it is appropriate briefly to survey its setting: Lawrence is in Akaba, recently taken by Sherifian forces; Aaronsohn is in Cairo and Port Said, but in touch with his compatriots cum agents in Palestine. Both he and Lawrence had lately queried the implications and repercussions of some of the activities in which they were involved. 

Lawrence had written to Mark Sykes, one of the architects of London's new approach to Zionist aspirations, on 7 September 1917 inquiring inter alia about Zionist aims. He sent the letter first to his superior, Clayton, commenting 'one must have the Jewish section cleared up; and I fancy we may (if we win) clear up the French section ourselves'. Clayton advised Lawrence not to forward the letter to Mark Sykes, and in fact it was not sent. 

Some passages in Lawrence's letter relate to Aaronsohn's memorandum:

 'About the Jews in Palestine, Feisal has agreed not to operate or agitate west of the Araba-Dead Sea-Jordan line, or south of the Haifa -Beisan line. . .

 'Now Feisal wants to know (information had better come to me for him since I usually like to make up my mind before he does) what is the arrangement standing between the colonist Jews (called Zionists sometimes) and the Allies. . .What have you promised the Zionists, and what is their programme? 

'I saw Aaronsohn in Cairo, and he said at once the Jews intended to acquire the land-rights of all Palestine from Gaza to Haifa, and have practical autonomy therein. Is this acquisition to be by fair purchase or by forced sale and expropriation? The present half-crop peasantry were the old freeholders and under Moslem landlords may be ground down but have fixity of tenure. Arabs are usually not employed by Jewish colonies. Do the Jews propose the complete expulsion of the Arab peasantry, or their reduction to a day-labourer class? . . .' ⁶ 

Aaronsohn had referred in his memorandum to some of the issues - he called them 'calumniations' - raised by Lawrence in his letter to Sykes. He himself had met Lawrence as early as February 1917, and had noted in his diary, '. . . A new appearance in the Arab Bureau - 2nd Lieutenant Lawrence, archaeologist, very versed in Palestinian topics. Overbearing.' 

On 12 August 1917, according to the diary, they met again. 'This morning I had a conversation with Capt. Lawrence. An interview without any evidence of friendliness. Lawrence had too much success at too early an age. Has a very high estimation of his own self. He is lecturing me on our colonies, on the spirit of the people, on the feelings of the Arabs, and we would do well in being assimilated by them, by the sons of Arab etc. While listening to him I imagined to be present at the lecture of a Prussian scientific anti-Semite expressing himself in English. I am afraid that many of the archaeologists and reverends have been imbued by 'l'esprit boche'. He is openly against us. He is basically of missionary stock'.⁷ 

Harsh words indeed; in contradiction of the words used by Weizmann. As far as we know Aaronsohn did not change his mind. He continued to see in T. E. Lawrence the close associate of Feisal, the 'Bedouins' and the 'Arabs' of whom he had the lowest opinion. 

Turning from Aaronsohn's more personal resentments - probably accounted for by his radical Zionism - to the general issues, such as expropriation, Lawrence, though never mentioned by name, seems always to loom in the background. 

Aaronsohn's opinions were:

' . . .This necessity of frequently displacing the land-tillers is regularly practiced by all Syrian landowners such as the Sursok family [which had sold large tracts of land to Zionist emissaries]. 

'It is very likely this removal, always unpleasant, sometimes even forcible, of the fellahin from the land they used to work, but never owned, that has given rise to the wholly unfounded calumny that the Jews drive out the poor landowner without paying him his due. . . 

'The Jews have been reproached for their exclusiveness and for keeping the Arabs out of their villages. It is true that we have strictly avoided Arab infiltration in our villages, and we are glad of it. From national, cultural, educational, technical and mere hygienic points of view this policy has had to be strictly adhered to; otherwise the whole Jewish Renaissance movement would fail. 

'Had we permitted the squalid, superstitious, ignorant fellahin, hard pressed by their Syrian brethren, the usurers, to live in close contact with the Jewish pioneers, still feeling their way and seeking the trail which might lead to their salvation, the slender chances of success which, at their start, was all that the Jewish settlements seemed to possess, would have been impaired, since we had no power, under the cruel Turkish administration, to enforce progressive methods, or even to ensure respect for private property'.⁸ 

Aaronsohn then accuses and vilifies :

'those Russian disorganising elements. . .who tried to implant in Palestine, in the Jewish milieu, all their bankrupt ideas and foolish dreams. . .They wanted the nationalisation of the land, the grant to every individual no more land than he could till with his own hands, the abolition of all capitalistic concerns and of the so-called exploitation of the Arabs; and to that end, however paradoxical it may sound, the interdiction of any other than Jewish labour on Jewish land, if we were to assert our national rights and national independence'.⁹ 

Of greater significance and of direct relevance to the issues between him and Lawrence is the last part of the memorandum, subtitled 'Attitudes of the Jews Towards the Arab Revolt. The background being the issues evolving out of the enlistment of Bedouin tribes, east and west of the Jordan River, into British strategic planning.' 

Aaronsohn wrote: 

'The Palestinian Jews have good reasons to hate the Turk and to help to rid the country of him. They have no interest, and still less confidence, in the Arab Revolt. They are not in a position to take up arms against the Turk, and they would hesitate to join the Arabs, even if they were in a position to do it. So far as we know the Arabs, the man among them who will withstand a bribe is still to be born. According to their own proverb; "Fifty prophets would turn liars before a Bedouin would speak the truth." Lack of idealism among the leaders, lack of real public opinion among the uneducated masses and, above all, Moslem solidarity, will always cause the Palestinian Jews to keep a neutral attitude in this fight between Turks and Arabs. In order to help to defeat the Turk they will readily join the British forces, but it is doubtful whether they will ever trust the Arabs. 

'But although we cannot promise our confidence and assistance to the Arabs in their striving for their national deliverance, we at least make no opposition to the success of their efforts, and abstention from active co-operation should not be taken advantage of by them to encourage, or placidly allow, attacks on Jewish property and life for mere reasons of jealousy and lust for robbery. Such attacks would hardly serve the Arab cause. International Jewry may still be too loosely organised to fight for the Jewish regeneration in Palestine; but it will always be found strongly organised when it comes to defeat the common foe. And the Arab leaders are too wise not to understand that, as well as the sympathies of Great Britain and France, the goodwill of international Jewry is still necessary in order to bring about the realisation of the Arab aims, national and financial'.¹⁰ 

I have reproduced here a significant and relevant portion of Aaronsohn's memorandum. No commentary was needed: the subject matter speaks for itself. 

Some of the obviously biased or prejudiced assertions made by its author seem to derive from a strongly ethnic view of human affairs; the 'memorandum' reflecting the conflict of interests between radical Zionism and the Arab Bureau. 

The relationship of these two extraordinary men should be viewed, also, in terms of their obviously dissimilar mental and psychological make-up and of their opposed views of and approach to 'the Arabs' in general, and the Bedouin in particular. 

References

1. Trial and Error (Hebrew version), third edition, p.234. 
2. Bruce Westrate, The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
3. T. E. Notes, Vol. III, No.8, October 1992. 
4. Jacob Rosen, 'Captain Reginald Hall and the Balfour Declaration', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.XXIV, No. I, January 1988, London. 
5. Ronald Storrs, Orientations, (London, Nicholson & Watson, 1937). 
6. Quoted in J. M. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia, (London, Heinemann, 1989) p. 442. 
7. Joram Epheati (ed.), Joman Aharon Aaronsohn, 1916-1919 (Tel Aviv, Kami Publishers, 1970). Freely translated from the Hebrew. 
8. Arab Bulletin, Bulletin N. 64. 9. ibid. 10. ibid.
9. ibid.
10. ibid.

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